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NOTES
On April 21st, a memorial meeting was held in the Law
School Building under the auspices of the Trustees of the Uni-
versity, the Law Faculty and the student body. Addresses were
made by persons representing these three bodies and by members
of the Philadelphia Bar. A pamphlet containing an account of
Mr. Flander's life and services and the proceedings at this meet-
ing will be published by the University and distributed as a sup-
plement to the June number of THE REVIEW.
NOTES.
RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID ON AN ILLEGAL TAX AssEssMENT.-
In the case of Shenango Furnace Co. v. Fairfield Twp. there was
an assessment of taxes for road purposes on an illegal valuation of
the complainant's mining property. Part of these excessive taxes the
complainant paid without duress, without protest, without fraud on
the part of the respondent, and with full knowledge of the law and
facts. The respondent threatened to begin judicial proceedings to
collect the unpaid balance. By bill in equity the complainant sought
three things: (I) An injunction restraining collection of the unpaid,
excessive balance; (2) an accounting; (3) a decree ordering the re-
spondent township to repay the complainant the amount paid in
excess of what was legally due. An injunction was granted restrain-
ing the collection of the balance not legally due, but the second and
third prayers of the bill were denied. Since the items were all ori
one side of the account there was no necessity for an accounting;
and since the prayer for an accounting was merely incidental the court
refused to allow it to confer jurisdiction in equity to order the repay-
ment of the excessive amount-a relief which, standing alone, equity
does not have jurisdiction to give, the remedy at law being adequate.
It is the purpose of this note to review briefly the principles which
govern the legal remedy, and the circumstances under which money
paid on an illegal tax assessment can be recovered at common law.
Where the right of recovery is conferred by statute, whether
or not it is a necessary pre-requisite that the illegal tax be paid in-
voluntarily seems to be a question of construction of the particular
statute; a majority of statutes allow recovery though the tax was
paid voluntarily.'
At common law illegal taxes voluntarily paid cannot be re-
178 AtI. 937 (II1 Pa.).
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covered.' The reason is that a payment voluntarily made is "an
asset to pay more in support of the government of the town than the
town had a right to demand, and the law does not imply the duty of
refunding" 5
The word "involuntarily" in this connection means more than an
unwilling payment accompanied by protest and a declaration of in-
tention to endeavor to recover it." It means that the payment was
made with protest under circumstances which in law amount to com-
pulsion.7  The generally accepted rule appears to be that when the
process which issues to enforce payment of an illegal tax is against
real estate and is such as will put a cloud on the title, the person pay-
ing the illegal tax under protest is not held to have paid it voluntarily,"
and can therefore recover the money in an action at law under the
common counts. And where the process is illegal on its face; i. e.,
where the irregularity appears on the record, it is not deemed such as
will put a cloud on title, and money thus paid 'cannot be recovered.
Such a case is made out where: (i) the land against which the
process actually issued was not that of the plaintiff; (2) the officer
issuing the warrant had no authority to do so; 1o (3) the assessment
was unconstitutional." (4) Unequal increase of assessed valuation of
one class of real estate without making the same increase on another
class.' 2
Pennsylvania seems to follow a different rule. When process
issues against land for the collection of taxes, whether the illegality
of the tax is apparent on the record or whether it is collateral thereto,
it is deemed to put a cloud on title. But that fact is held not to be
sufficient compulsion to render the payment involuntary; the plaintiff
'McKibben v. Oneida Co., 49 N. Y. S. 553 (1898).
Moller v. Galveston, 57 S. W. 1116 (Tex. 19oo).
Bank v. Memphis, 64 S. W. 13 Tenn. (19ol).
Lackey v. Mercer Co., 9 Pa. 318.
Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Pa. 73.
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must first exhaust his legal and equitable remedies. 8 If he then
makes payment and the tax turns out to be illegal, he can recover the
money thus paid, in assumpsit.
It seems that a different rule rightly obtains where personal
property is liable to seizure for non-payment of the illegal tax. In
such case the owner will be deprived immediately of his possession,
while in the case of real estate the sheriff merely makes the sale
and then leaves the parties to fight out their right to possession in
an action of ejectment. For this reason where personalty is levied
on, or about to be levied on, and is answerable for the illegal tax
under such circumstances as will deprive the owner of his possession,
payment then made is held to be involuntary, and recovery can be
had, even though payment was made without protest.
14
In view of the necessity that public funds, which are intended
for immediate expenditure for the common good, should be reason-
ably free from claims by the individuals who have contributed thereto,
and in order to secure the most beneficial use for the public, it seems
that the difficulties imposed upon the individual in recovering from
that fund are wise and reasonable. And this is especially true in view
of the fact that, the rights of the individual are amply protected by
the avenues of escape from the payment of an illegal tax which 'are
open to him, such as review, appeal, or defense to proceedings to
enforce the tax. 5
J.F.S.
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"I. Bill in equity to enjoin collection will lie in following cases:
i. Exempt property.
University of South v. Jetton, 155 F. 182.
Bates v. Parker, 227 Ill. 120 (1907).
2. Where taxing bodies have or are about to act fraudulently or
illegally.
(a) Not having jurisdiction.
Lumber Co. v. Lattimore, lO5 S. W. 1O28.
Hemple v. City of Hastings, 113 N. W. 187.
Caldwell Co. v. Smith, 59 S. E. 653 (9o7).
Gas Co. v. Ratliff, 31 Ky. L. R. 1229 (1907).
3. Where it will cause irreparable injury, i. e., no remedy at law.
Hallet v. Arapahoe Co. Com'rs (Colo.), 90 P. 678.
4. Assessment under unconstitutional law.
Green v. Hutchinson, 57 S. E. 353 (,9o7).
5. Property is not owned by plaintiff.
Weber v. Baird, 2o8 11. 209.
6. Where taxes have been paid.
Hamberg v. Western Storage Co., 231 Ill. 32.
Nyce v. Schmoll, 40 Ind. App. 555 (1907).
II. By suit to remove cloud on title.
Regan Land Co. v. Carthage, Io8 S. W. 589.
College v. Berryman, 156 F. 112 (i9o7).
III. By appeal.
Wharton v. Borough of Birmingham, 37 Pa. (i Wright) 371 (1861).
NOTES
BANKRUPTCY-RESTOPATION OF EMBEZZLED TRUST-FUND AS A
VOIDABLE PREFERENE.-In Clarke v. Rogers, 183 Fed. 518, the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the First Circuit recently held that the
restitution to the trust fund of substituted securities by the default-
ing trustee may constitute a preference voidable upon his subsequent
bankruptcy, that a bankrupt may in his individual capacity have
preferred himself in his trustee capacity, and, inferentially, that a de-
faulting trustee is debtor to the trust.' The same facts had never
concurred in an American case. A long line of English decisions
reach an opposite conclusion from this case. This variance is partly
accounted for in the difference in construction under the bankrupt
acts. In England a transfer in order to be a voidable preference
must be clearly voluntary and with the intent to prefer as the
dominant motive on the part of the transferror. 2 So English courts
have refused to avoid a preference where they have found it was
made not with intent to prefer but primarily to rectify the wrong
done,3 or to shield the wrongdoer from the consequences of his de-
fault,4 or through fear of suit or exposure on account of a threat
real or imagined 5 by one of the parties interested.6 The first of the
English decisions 7 however went on the broader ground that such
a transaction as this was not within the general purpose of statutes
in bankruptcy.
At first we may be inclined to sympathize with the result reached
in the English cases if we feel that ces*tuis que trustent deserve
greater protection in the hands of the law than ordinary creditors.
Nevertheless under the decisions construing our bankrupt law the
conclusion in the American case is at least logical, if not inevitable.
From section 6oa, such a transfer as will enable any one of his
creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other
of such creditors of the same class is a preference. It is a voidable
preference if the creditor shall have had reasonable cause to believe
In this case the bankrupt, a testatmentary trustee had disposed of some
of the securities which should have been in his possession. The surety in
his bond discovered this fact and persuaded him to replace these with
securities of his own. At the time he was to his own knowledge insolvent
and within four months was adjudicated a bankrupt. The trustee in bank-
ruptcy recovered these securities .from the trustees on the ground of unlaw-
ful preference.
'Under the American Act the preference must be voluntary, but although
intent to prefer is requisite to constitute a preference an act of bankruptcy,
it is doubtful at least in the case of preferences which may be avoided by
the trustee. See Remington on Bankruptcy § 1405.
"Ex parte Stubbins [1881], 17 Ch. D. 58.
Ex parte Dyer [19ol], 1 K. B. 710.
'Sharp v. Jackson [i8gg], A. C. 419.
'Thompson v. Freeman [1786], 1 T. R. 155.
"Ex parte Taylor [i886], I8 Q. B. D. 295.
'Ex parte Stubbins, supra.
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that it was intended thereby to give a preference.8 The intent, if
indeed it is necessary under the American rule, is found in that
entertained by the bankrupt, Shaw, "in his individual capacity,
while the reasonable cause to assume the intent, on the part of the
preferred creditor, appertained to Shaw as testamentary trustee in
that capacity." As to other creditors of the same class, that element
is present in the fact that the bankrupt here was testamentary trustee
over several other estates in which there were shortages. The court
by dictum admits that these various estates may share in the dis-
tribution of the bankrupt's estate.9 It is unnecessary to say whether
they are creditors of the same class with his other obligees.
The real difficulty of the case lies in conceiving the bankrupt
in his trustee capacity as a creditor. Authority has not agreed upon
a definition of the word "creditor."' 10 Some have limited its applica-
tion to those to whom there is an obligation in debt or in contract.
Others would extend it to those to whom there is an obligation
ex delicto, even where not reduced to judgment and where the tort
is such as cannot be waived and sued upon in assumpsit, as e. g.,
seduction or slander. A more troublesome question would be
whether it includes obligations enforceable 'only in equity.
The difficulty of an abstract definition of the word "creditor"
should not disturb us in the limited field of bankruptcy for in
section I of the Act of July I, 1898, "creditor" is defined to "include
anyone who owns any demand or claim provable in bankruptcy."
Thus preferences are within the same subject-matter as "claims
provable." By section 63a provable debts include those founded
upon implied contracts. Section 63b provides too that "unliquidated
claims against the bankrupt may be liquidated and proved and al-
lowed against his estate." These sections have been construed to
include such torts as may be resolved into an implied contract."
The objection that a breach of trust is an equitable rather than
a legal tort, seems never to have been raised.1 2 The answer would
probably be that bankruptcy proceedings are essentially equitable in
their nature and thus could take cognizance of breaches of equitable
as well as legal duties. The court here believes that when the
trustee committed a breach of his trust there arose an obligation
$Under the Amendment of June 25, i9IO, C. 412, 36 Stat. 842, the prefer-
ence is voidable where there is reasonable cause to believe that the enforce-
ment of the judgment or transfer would effect a preference," apparently
doing away with the element of intent. The principal case was pending and
thus not affected by this recent amendment.
"Accord: Keble v. Thompson (1791), 3 B. C. C. 112.
Ex parte Shakesbaft, 3 B. C. C. 197.
Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17.
See also Lewin on Trusts, iith Ed. 1157.
"See Words and Phrases, Tit., "Creditor."
"Brown v. United Button Co., 149 Fed. 48.
Tindle v. Birkett, 2o5 U. S. 183.
"Lewin on Trusts at page 1146 and Godefroi on Trusts at page 939.
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contractual in nature, to restore the value of the assets embezzled.13
Trusts involve some of the elements of contract but are of a more
transcendent character and include so much more that they may
not be reduced to the ordinary elements of contract.
Granted then that the obligation to make good upon a breach
of trust is a claim provable in bankruptcy on a par with those of
other creditors, it seems to be a logical conclusion that a voluntary
transfer to carry out this obligation is within the confines of "void-
able preferences," although the transaction does appear at first glance
to be outside of the usual contemplation and general purposes of
statutes in bankruptcy.
S.L.H.
BOOK ENTRIES.--The case of West Virginia Architects and
Builders v. Stewart,1 held that books of original entry of a contractor
and builder kept by a bookkeeper, who, according to an established
system or method of transacting the business, records the oral or
written reports made to him by one or more persons, in the regular
course of business, of transactions lying in the personal knowledge
of the latter, whether such bookkeeper have personal knowledge of
such transaction or not, are admissible in evidence in tonnection
with the testimony of such bookkeeper showing the regularity of
the entries therein by him, to prove an account therein, without
the evidence of the witnesses having personal knowledge of the
transactions, provided the testimony of such witnesses, because of
death, interest, incompetency, absence, inconvenience or otherwise
be unavailing.
The general rule requires that the entrant must have had
personal knowledge of the transaction.2  Though recognizing its
existence, and citing a great many cases which follow it, the Court,
relying chiefly on Professor Wrigmore's exception, qualifies the
rule.
The general principle of testimonial evidence is, that the person
whose statement is received as testimony should speak from personal
observation or knowledge. This principle does not, however, neces-
sarily exclude all entries made by persons not having personal knowl-
edge of the facts entered. If the element of personal knowledge
can somehow be adequately supplied by a third person, it is imma-
terial that the entrant himself did not have this personal knowledge.
Professor Wigmore gives three possible situations:
Perry on Trusts, 6th Ed. § 843.
Dornford v. Dornford, 12 Vesey 127.
Moons v. De Bernales, i Russ. 3oi.
Smith v. Frost, 70 N. Y. 65.
Snyder v. Parmalee, 8o Vt. 496.
Holderman v. Hood, 70 Kans. 267.
170 S. E. 113 (I911).
'Vinal v. Gilman, 21 W. Va. 301.
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(i) If the entrant be deceased, and the actor in the transaction
swears to the correctness of his original memorandum or oral report
the element of personal knowledge is sufficiently supplied, and the
entry is admissible if made in the regular course of business.
(2) If the transactor be deceased, but the entrant swear to
the entry as correctly representing the memorandum or oral report,
such entry, if based on a memorandum, would be sufficient, as sup
plying the element of the transactor's personal knowledge, if made
in the regular course of business, its production being impossible by
destruction, and the transactor being unavailable by decease.
(3) If both entrant and transactor be deceased, the entry is
admissible.
A possible fourth case is where the transactor is unavailable.
The result need not be different: the rule being, that where an entry
is made by one person in the regular course of business, recording an
oral or written report, made to him by one or more other persons
in the regular course of business, of a transaction lying in the per-
sonal knowledge of the latter, there is no objection to receiving
that entry, provided the practical inconvenience of producing on the
stand the numerous persons thus concerned would in the particular
case outweigh the probable utility of doing so.
The rulings on the subject may be classified:
(a) Cases admitting verified regular entries without requiring
the original observer having personal knowledge to be produced or
accounted for.
(b) Cases admitting verified regular entries after a showing
that the original observer was deceased; possibly absence from the
jurisdiction, insanity, or the like, would equally have sufficed.
(c) Cases excluding such entries because the original observer
was in no way accounted for, or declaring that he must be produced,
without deciding what excuse, if any, for non-production would
suffice.
(d) A few rulings inexorably exclude such entries even where
the original observer is accounted for as absent from the jurisdiction,
or the like.$
The following cases seem to require the presence of the original
observer:
The Norma,' held that a bill of particulars containing numerous
items of work and materials may be proved, after destruction of the
original memoranda, from which the account was made up, by the
.evidence of the bookkeeper that he correctly transcribed the memo-
randa and the testimony of the persons who made and furnished the
memoranda to him that the same were correct; but the proof is in-
sufficient where it consists only of the bookkeeper's testimony as to
the correctness of his transcription.
I Wigmore: Evidence, §1530.
468 Fed. 5og (i9o5).
NO TES
Stidger v. McPhee,5 decided that evidence that the custom of a
store was not to make an entry of sales until the goods were de-
livered, and that a salesman brought the witness a slip showing the
sale of the goods in question, and the date of their delivery, and that
thereon he made an entry in the daybook, and that making the slip
and delivery were concurrent acts, is insufficient to sustain the ad-
mission of the daybook to show delivery at such time, the salesman
not being produced.
Miller v. Shay,8 held that if goods are delivered by a servant,
and his entries or marks are transferred to the master's account
book, the servant is a competent and necessary witness to support-the
charges and to prove the delivery.
Taylor-Woolfender Co. v. Atkinson 7 laid down the rule that
where, in an action to recover for goods sold, the plaintiff showed
that the entries in its ledger were made from slips, made out in
duplicate by the clerks who made the sales and one of them sent to
the bundle counter and the other to the bookkeeper, it was necessary
for the plaintiff to prove, to the satisfaction of the jury, that no
entry was made except from slips, that no such slips were sent to the
bookkeeper except when the goods, accompanied by a duplicate slip,
were sent to the bundle counter, and that all goods sent to the
bundle counter were delivered, to make the ledger admissible in evi-
dence.
In Mayor of N. Y. v. Second Ave. Ry. Co.' it was sought to
prove the number of day's labor in making certain repairs by a time
book, kept by one Wilt made up from reports of the foreman. It
was held that the time book was inadmissible upon the testimony of
either the foreman, or of Wilt, separately considered. "But com-
bining the testimony of Wilt and the gang foreman, there was, first,
original evidence that laborers were employed, and that their time
was correctly reported by persons who had personal knowledge of
the facts, and that their reports were made in the ordinary course
of business, and in accordance with the duty of the persons making
them, and in point of time were contemporaneous with the trans-
actions to which the reports related; and, second, evidence by the
person who received the reports, that he correctly entered them as re-
ported, in the time book, in the usual course of business and duty."
The following cases are in favor of the rule in the case under
discussion:
Lawrence v. Stiles,9 held that the original entries in a book of
account are competent evidence if the person making them testifies
that the entries therein made are correct even though it appears that
5 15 Colo. App. 252 (900).
6 145 Mass. 162 (887).
127 Mich. 633 (io.
*.io2 N. Y. 572 (I886).
9 16 Ill. App. 489.
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he has no, recollection of the transaction, independently of thebook
entries.
Chisholm v. Beaman Machine Co.,10 stands for the proposition
that books of account showing entries for time for workmen are ad-
missible in evidence against a party who was to pay the expense of
such work, though such entries were made the day after the work
was done, from time slips made by the workmen and marked "ap-
proved" by the foremen, who testify to their correctness, while the
men who made the entries on the books testify the slips were cor-
rectly copied.
Though these and similar cases" may possibly be distinguished
from West Virginia Architects and Builders v. Stewart, the same
principle of necessity and inconvenience amounting to practical im-
possibility of producing the original observers runs through them all.
nd it seems that even where, because of the survival of some archaic
rule excluding the plaintiffs in the West Virginia case from testifying
on the ground of interest, that such subdivision of "inconvenience"
should not throw out the books.
T. W. B., 3rd.
i 16o Ill. ioi (1896).
'Little Rock Granite Co. v. Dallas County, 66 Fed. 522; Redlich v. Baner-
lee, 98 Ill. 134.
